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David O'Brien* Case Comment: Burnett v.
C.B.C. & Maclntyre**
The combinations and permutations available to an audio-visual type
of presentation are endless. How, then, should the established legal
principles which have stood the test of time respond to a broadcast...?
Are they appropriate or adequate or must we now develop modifica-
tions or even entirely new principles to be fair to all sides?
- Miller J., in Lougheed v. C.B. C. (1978), 4 C.C.L.T. 287 (Alta.S.C.,
T.D.), at 297.
The Burnett cases' had their origin in an episode of "the Maclntyre
File", a public affairs programme produced by the Canadian Broad-
casting Corporation (C.B.C.) and narrated by host Linden MacIn-
tyre (MacIntyre). The epidsode in question was broadcast to the
three Maritime provinces by the defendant corporation on 22 Sep-
tember 1978.
The plaintiffs launched two separate defamation actions. The
actions were tried together, unconsolidated, by Grant J., sitting
without jury in Truro. Burnett (No. 1) alleged defamation in the
television programme itself; Burnett (No. 2) alleged defamation in
connection with an interview conducted in preparation for the televi-
sion documentary. In Burnett (No. 1), nothing in the script was found
to be defamatory regarding the plaintiffs. But portions of the script,
when considered in conjunction with the visual pictures on the screen
while the words were spoken, were held to be defamatory in their
combined effect. In Burnett (No. 2), there was found to be no
defamation because the interview at issue between MacIntyre and the
mayor of Port Hawkesbury was deemed to have occurred in circum-
stances giving rise to the defence of qualified privilege.
* David O'Brien, LL.B. Dalhousie 1983.
** This paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the course in
Media Law at Dalhousie Law School.
1. Joseph Burnett, Burnac Leaseholds Ltd., Burnac Corporation Ltd and Burnac
Realty Investors Ltd. v. C.B.C. and Lynden Maclntyre (1981), S.T. 00842; S.H. 26110
(N.S.S.C., T.D.), hereinafter referred to as Burnett (No. 1). Joseph Burnett, Burnac
Leaseholds Ltd., Burnac Corporation Ltd., and Burnac Realty Investors Ltd. v. C.B.C.
and Lynden Maclntyre (1981), S.T. 00843; S.H. 26111 (N.S.S.C, T.D.), hereinafter
referred to as Burnett (No. 2). All page references to the Burnett cases refer to the page
numbers of the unreported judgments. Since the writing of this comment the two
judgments have been reported. They are to be found at (1981), 48 N.S.R. (2d) 1, and 48
N.S.R. (2d) 181, respectively.
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This case comment is concerned primarily with Burnett (No. 1)
and the case's implications for defamation actions where the subject
matter complained of is audio-visual material. It might be noted as a
point of interest that the Burnett cases received substantial attention
from the media in Nova Scotia. The pleadings were extensive, and
the trial decisions run some 197 pages in length. The parties settled
the question of damages privately after the decisions on liability were
handed down.
At issue in Burnett (No. 1) was an episode of the "Maclntyre File"
entitled "Law of the Jungle". It dealt extensively with the business of
shopping mall development in Eastern Canada, and the attendant
financial problems of such developments. The plaintiffs were financi-
ers and contractors involved in mall construction. The main theme of
the "Law of the Jungle" episode was the legal liability of mall
developers,-Joe Burnett in particular. This primary theme was
supplemented by a secondary theme of abuse of receivership and
bankruptcies. Maclntyre examined Burnett operations in five
locales.2 As a result of his investigations, Maclntyre suggested the
existence of a "formula", which may be regarded as the essence of the
"story" the programme sought to convey:
It's a deceptively simple formula and it's been repeated many times in
Eastern Canada. A development company with obscure origins
shows up. He's got a handful of cash, but reassuring backing on
paper. There's a worrisome construction period, a financial catharsis,
legal confusion. Then, when the dust settles, a new owner, who isn't
exactly new in the overall picture. There are people who claim
Burnett is in the process from the start, somehow behind the devel-
opment company, even the early mortgage money. It can't be proved
yet, but there are grounds to support that belief.3
This passage conveys the flavour of the script. Visual shots included
pictures of Burnett from a C.B.C. Toronto production on organized
crime called "Connections". Other video pictures included a shot of
the Watergate building in Washington, and a picture of a graveyard
in the opening. This brief summary should indicate the general tenor
or nature of the programme. Grant J. found that,
... the programme was defamatory of the plaintiffs. I have examined
the words spoken by the host, the defendant Linden Maclntyre ... and
found the words themselves were not defamatory. I have found the
2. Kirkland Lake, Ont.: Comerbrook, Nfld.; Dartmouth, N.S.; Port Hawkesbury, N.S.;
and Sydney, N.S.
3. Burnett (No. 1) at 54.
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cumulative effect of the words and the images were defamatory of the
plaintiffs. 4 [Emphasis added.]
This would seem to be the first explicit instance in Anglo-Canadian
law where the cumulative effect of non-defamatory words and
images in an audio-visual presentation has been held to be defama-
tory. How did Grant J. arrive at this finding?
The learned trial judge, in each Burnett case, includes a weighty
section subtitled "The Law". Here he sets out lengthy excerpts, from
several authorities, on the various elements of a defamation action
and the defences available. 5 Extensive use was made of fair comment
as a defence in Burnett (No. 1), but in his section on"The Law" of fair
comment 6, Grant J. makes reference to only one recent case: Bartrop
v. C.B. C. 7 No reference at all is made to the recent Supreme Court of
Canada ruling on fair comment in Cherneskey v. Armadale Publish-
ers et al.8 Mr. Justice Grant does not enter into any discussion of the
roughly sixteen pages of excerpts of "The Law" which he reproduces
from the authorities. It is a ponderous mass of black letter doctrine.
Although Grant J. makes no comment on the various principles
enunciated, he does distil from it a summary of the different functions
of the judge and jury in determining questions of fact and law in a
defamation trial. This analysis is contained in almost identical forms
Burnett (No. 1) and Burnett (No. 2). This summary is reproduced
here in full:
4. Id. at 1-2.
5. He relies principally on Gatley on Libel and Slander, 7th Ed.; Salmondon Torts, 17th
Ed.; Wright and Linden on Canadian Tort Law, 7th Ed.; and Williams on The Law of
Defamation.
6. Burnett (No. 1) at 20-24.
7. Bartrop v. C.B.C. (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 637 (N.S.S.C., App. Div.).
8. Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers et al (1979), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). The
majority opinion held that, in order for fair comment to apply, each publisher must
establish his honest belief in the matter published. The Cherneskey rulingre fair comment
has been considered in Vander Zalm v. Times Publishers, [1980] 4 W.W.R. 259
(B.C.C.A.); Whittaker et al. v. Huntington (1980) 15 C.C.L.T. 19 (B.C.S.C.); and
Thomas v. C.B.C. (1981), 16 C.C.L.T. 113 (N.W.T.S.C.). The majority opinion in
Cherneskey has come under heavy criticism. See, e.g., M. R. Doody, "Comment on
Cherneskey" (1980), 58 Can.B.Rev. 174. In the New Brunswick case of Baxterv. C.B.C. &
Mailing (1919), 29 N.B.R. (2d) 114 (Q.B.,T.D.), Stratton J. makes no reference to the
majority in Cherneskey, but rather cites the test for fair comment which Dickson J.
unsuccessfully advocated in the Cherneskey dissent. When the Baxter case went on
appeal, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to comment on
Stratton J.'s apparent approval of the Dickson dissent in Cherneskey. It will be interesting
to see if other Canadian courts follow the example of Stratton J. in "losing" the
Cherneskey majority holding.
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Most cases of defamation of this province are tried by a judge
sitting with a jury. As I understand the law and practice, there are
clearly defined roles for each to play. I am sitting as both judge and
jury and I consider that I should make my findings and rulings on fact
and la'w in tarzhinanm-t
Whether there was in fact a publication of certain words, I under-
stand is a question of fact for the jury with the burden of proof being
on the plaintiffs.
Whether the words or images complained of refer to the plaintiffs
is a question of fact for the jury with the burden of proof being on the
plaintiffs.
Whether the words or images or sounds complained of are reason-
ably capable of a defamatory meaning in their natural and ordinary
meaning, that is, of being defamatory, is a question of law for the
judge.
Whether the words, images or sound complained of in their natu-
rt autd oardinj meating, under the existing fazts and dircumste.tnc
are defamatory of the plaintiffs is a question of fact for the jury.
Whether the words, images or sounds complained of are capable
of being interpreted by right thinking members of society in the
meaning attributed to them by the plaintiffs in their pleadings, is a
question of law for the judge.
Whether the words, images or sounds complained of under the
peculiar existing facts and circumstances bear the meaning attributed
to them by the plaintiffs in their pleadings (the innuendo pleaded),
that is, whether they are defamatory of the plaintiffs, is a question of
fact for the jury.
Relating to the defence of justification whether a fact is substan-
tial y true in substance and in fact is a. que ton of fact for the S ury.
Relating to the defence of fair comment whether the words are
capable of being comment is a question of law for the judge. Whether
they are in fact comment is a question of fact for the jury. If they are
comment it is a question of fact for the jury to determine if they are
fair comment or not.
The question of public interest is a question of law for the judge to
determine.
Whether the occasion of publication is one enjoying a qualified
privilege is a question of law for thejudge. If the surrounding facts are
in issue then these facts are for the jury to decide.
If there is evidence of malice then the question of whether the
defendant was actuated by malice is a question of fact for the jury.9
This summary is to be regarded as a useful practice aid for counsel
involved in defamation actions. It would be a handy aide-mdmoire to
9. Burnett (No. 2) at 23-4.
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keep at one's side during the trial and Mr. Justice Grant is to be
commended for producing it.
Grant J. proceeds to examine the script using the summary set out
above as a framework of sorts. Much of the judgment concerns
assessment of individual statements made in the course of the pro-
gramme. The learned trial judge finds that none of the words spoken
by MacIntyre or his guests were defamatory of any of the plaintiffs.10
In the interests of brevity, I restrict my comment on this aspect of
the judgment to one allegedly defamatory instance in the script,
which may be regarded as representative of others.
Burnett objected to the term "loan sharking" made in reference to
him in the following context:
Today he borrows from banks and American investment syndicates
at moderately high interest rates and lends it out at very high rates. It's
a legalform of loan sharking called short term and bridge financing.
It's a risky business, but Burnett's talent for manipulating money and
using the law to his advantage practically eliminates risk for him."
[Emphasis added.]
The trial judge finds that right-thinking members of society would
understand "loan sharking" to mean "charging excessive amounts of
money for lending money." 2 The evidence suggested that Burnett
sometimes charged prime plus three percent or prime plus four
percent on loans, together with other fees added on top for finding
the loan money. Grant J. analyzes the statement as follows:
I find this statement to be capable of a defamatory meaning. I find it,
in fact, was not defamatory of the plaintiffs. I find the term 'loan
sharking' to be capable of being a comment. I find it to be a comment
and fair comment as defined herein.
I find that the interest plus the various charges would amount to
'loan sharking' in the interpretation of that term by the viewers being
'right thinking members of society generally'.' 3
Let us examine this analysis more closely.
It is not at all clear why Grant J. finds this statement is capable of
being defamatory, and yet concludes it is not defamatory. The
question of whether words are capable or not capable of being
defamatory is one which arises principally when,
10. Burnett (No. 1) at 65-6.
11. Id. at 60.
12. Id., Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) finds the term a little
stronger in meaning, There, "loanshark" is defined as one who lends money to individuals
at extortionate interest rates.
13. Burnett (No. 1) at 62-3.
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the defendant will wish to contend that the words are incapable of
bearing the meaning or meanings (or some of the meanings) put
forward by the plaintiff.14
That does not seem to have been the case here; the meaning of "loan
sharking" does not appear to have been much at issue. The real
question is simply whether the term is defamatory or not. The classic
test is that set out by Lord Akin in Sim v. Stretch:
...would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society generally?' 5
Applying this to the "loan sharking" statement, one would tend to
think the words would so lower the reputation of the plaintiff. One
might cite Gatley in support of this view:
It has been held defamatory ... to impute'any dishonourable conduct
to another though not involving a breach of positive law.16
Loan sharking could hardly be regarded as "honourable". With all
respect to the learned trial judge, it is submitted the term is defama-
tory. But this does not necessarily mean that liability should follow.
The defences of fair comment or justification might still be estab-
lished to absolve the defendant of his liability.
The learned trial judge says that fair comment does apply in this
instance. But recall that in the very next sentence, he says:
I find that the interest plus the various charges would amount to 'loan
sharking' in the interpretation of that term .... 17
This sounds very much as if the term is being treated as a question of
fact, rather than comment, and that justification is being appied.
Grant J. seems to be saying here that it is a true statement of fact,
although he has already held it to be fair comment. Can it be both
fact and comment? The learned trial judge does not tackle the "fact or
comment" issue here, although it seems to be an obvious problem.
The problem 'of "fact or comment" received attention from
MadKeigan C.J.N.S. in the Barltrop case:
To be comment, fair or unfair, a statement must be a statement of
opinion and not a statement of fact. It must be an expression of
opinion about facts which must have been presented to the readers or
14. Duncan and Neill on Defamation (1978) at 15.
15. Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237 (H.L.) at 1240.
16. Gatley on Libel and Slander, supra, note 5 at para. 50. This paragraph from Gatley
was referred to with approval by MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in the Barltrop case, supra, note 7
at 656.
17. Burnett (No. 1) at 63.
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listeners, or be well known to them, and which must themselves be
substantially true.'8 [Emphasis added.]
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. says very clearly that a statement of fact cannot
qualify as comment. With great respect, this may be too broad. In the
case of Sheppard v. Bulletin 19, Stuart J. says that, in general, com-
ment can only be an expression of opinion. But there is an exception,
he says, where comment may consist of fact. He refers to the words of
Field J. in O'Brien v. Marquis of Salisbury in support:
It seems to me that comment may sometimes consist in the statement
of a fact, and may be held to be comment, if the fact so stated appears
to be a deduction or conclusion come to by the speaker from other
facts stated or referred to by him, or in the common knowledge of the
person speaking, and those to whom the words are addressed and
from which his conclusion may reasonably be inferred.... [I]f,
although stated as a fact, it is preceded or accompanied by such other
facts and it can reasonably be based upon them, the words may
reasonably be regarded as comment .... 20 [Emphasis added.]
See also Duncan & Neill on Defamation, where the learned authors
say:
The defence of fair comment is not restricted merely to such epithets
as the commentator may apply to the subject matter commented
upon, but can include inferences of fact drawn by the commentator. 21
Let us now return to the allegedly defamatory statement itself:
...It's a legal form of loan sharking called short term and bridge
financing.... 2
Maclntyre is saying that Burnett was invovled in short term and
bridge financing and that such conduct is a legal form of loan
sharking; in short, that Burnett was involved in legal loan sharking. Is
this statement one of opinion such as MacKeigan C.J.N.S. would
require for fair comment; or is it rather a statement of fact, not
capable of being comment? Following the Barltrop principle, where
comment excludes fact, it looks very much like a statement of fact.
Justification would be available, but fair comment could not apply.
18. Barltrop, supra, note 7 at 657. The treatment of the "fact or comment" issue by the
Chief Justice here has been well regarded. See e.g. K. R. Evans, "Defamation in
Broadcasting" (1979) 5 Dal.L.J. 659 at 675.
19. Sheppard v. Bulletin (1916), 27 D.L.R. 562 (AIta.S.C.), rev'd on other grounds at
(1917), 55 S.C.R. 454.
20. Cited id., at 566-7. O'Brien v. Marquis of Salisbury (1889), 6 T.L.R. 133 (Q.B.Div.).
21. Duncan & Neill on Defamation, supra, note 14 at 66.
22. See also context of statement, supra, at 6.
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But it is submitted the statement should more properly be classified
as falling within the ambit of the O'Brien and Sheppard cases. It is
argued that the allegation of loan sharking here is one of fact which is
a "deduction or conclusion come to by the speaker from other facts
stated or referred to by him," as Field J. put it. It is argued this
classification of "fact as comment" is semantically more appropriate
here than a classification of "fact" or "comment" as defined in
Barltrop. The defence of fair comment therefore would become
available on the basis of O'Brien and Bulletin.
Let us summarize at this point. If the impugned statement re loan
sharking must be classified as fact or comment, as defined in Barl-
trop, then it is argued the impugned statement was more "fact" than
"comment". If Grant J. purported to follow a strict reading of
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in Barltrop, it is argued he probably erred in
applying "comment" and consequently "fair comment" here. But
Grant J. did find the statement to be one of comment. In doing so, it
is argued, he must have been taking the "fact as comment" approach
outlined in Bulletin v. Sheppard. It should be apparent that the
approaches set out in Barltrop and Bulletin cannot live happily
together. Which should prevail?
It is acknowledged that in advocating a re-affirmation of the "fact
as comment" category, one might be accused of "muddying the
waters". But it is suggested that the result of re-affirming "fact as
comment" is simply to enlarge the scope of "comment" even if the
boundary between "comment" and "fact" remains muddy as a result.
The instant example of loan sharking exemplifies the need for the
retention of "fact as comment". Although but a single phrase is
involved, and its defamatory meaning seems clear, yet that one
phrase would seem to defy precise categorization as either fact or
comment (when comment is defined to mean only "opinion"). The
intermediary classification of loan sharking as "fact as comment"
seems more in accord with accurate semantical construction. Reten-
tion of the intermediary classification provides more maneuverability
of construction by the judge. Retention of the intermediary classifica-
tion can also be advocated on policy grounds.
Fair comment, as Chief Justice MacKeigan himself affirms, "has
been rightly termed 'a basic safeguard against irresponsible political
power' and 'one of the foundations supporting our standards of
personal liberty'."23 By retaining "fact as comment" as part of the
legal definition of "comment", this legal category of "comment"
23. Barltrop, supra, note 7 at 657.
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could have wider scope than it would if limited to only "opinion" as
was suggested (perhaps obiter?) in Barltrop. Because "comment"
would have wider scope, the defence of fair comment would have
wider application. "Fact as comment", it is argued, is a useful sub-
category of "comment". Its legitimacy, impugned in Barltrop, should
be clarified. The "loan sharking" allegation in Burnett (No. 1) would
have been a suitable occasion for doing so.
It should be apparent from the foregoing analysis that the learned
trial judge's reasoning in this instance was less than clear. In most of
the instances of alleged defamations in the script, he merely gives his
conclusions. This is a major problem with the judgment. One other
example will suffice to illustrate this. One of Maclntyre's guests, a
certain John Gamble, says in reference to Burnett:
In his case I don't think that I would advise [another contractor] to
have anything whatever to do with him [Burnett], in any way, shape
or form.24
The learned trial judge treats this alleged defamation in the following
manner:
I find this latter statement of Gamble to be capable of a defamatory
meaning. I find, however, that it is, in fact, not defamatory of the
plaintiffs.25
Why not? There is no further elaboration on this particular finding.
No part of the script gave rise to liability. We must now turn our
attention to the part of the programme which did give rise to liability.
Imagine the following television scene. The words are being
spoken by Linden MacIntyre, with reference to Joe Burnett:
His deals are under constant observation by the R.C.M.P. The
Department of National Revenue has seized many of his corporate
records and in August of this year launched an inquiry under the
Income Tax Act (Picture of Department of National Revenue
shown) into his and his companies' finances between 1970 and 1977.
Places like this thrive on the competition for wealth and influence.
(Picture of Toronto's financial district shown again) [sic] Competi-
tion is an industry in itself, an industry that is finely programmed so
that the first and greatest impacts of success happen here and the
worst shocks of failure are absorbed somewhere else. (Picture of Joe
Burnett in black car smoking cigar shown again) The law is supposed
to neutralize the manipulations and dirty tricks that make big busi-
ness apredatory, cut-throat game for some people. If the legitimate
24. Burnett (No. 1) at 64.
25. Id. at 65.
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instrument, receivership, is being used as a weapon to victimize
people, then perhaps the law should be improved.
Linden Maclntyre: (Picture of following car - presumably Burnett's)
Should there be more policing and if so, where and by whom?
26
WEmphasi aded.1
Grant J. holds that the words spoken here are covered by fair
comment or justification. He then pinpoints the specific words
emphasized in the script, supra, and holds as follows:
"I find the use of these terms themselves by MacIntyre does not refer
to the plaintiffs but the showing of Burnett's picture or that of the car
in which he is seated, while the words are being said or shortly before,
draws the irresistable inference that Burnett and/or his companies
are involved in these activities.
I find this to be the part of the film where the viewer, already
saturated with facts and situations, now draws the conclusion that
the man shown is engaged in these activities. I find also a viewer
would conclude that the man in the picture is Burnett and that the
man in the car is Burnett."
27
It was at this point in the programme, according to Grant J., that the
viewer would connect the abuse of receivership/ bankruptcies theme
with the theme of Burnett's doings in the mall development business.
The viewer would conclude that "Burnett abuses the law of receiver-
ship and/or bankruptcy in that industry."28 This was the narrow
defamatory meaning which arose from the script combined with the
visual effects in the portion of the programme described above. It is
important to note that the judge did not find the programme, consi-
dered as a whole, to be defamatory of the plaintiffs. He did hold that
the "words and images used in the programme (considering the same
as a whole) were capable of a defamatory meaning" 29, but he elabo-
rates no further.
The first question which arises immediately is why it is only in one
particular segment where strong language, not per se defamatory
according to Grant J., combines with a picture of Burnett in his car to
crystallize into defamation. If at this point, why not at others in the
programme? Next. If the two "themes" of abuse of law and Burnett's
dealings are brought together in the course of the programme, and
we know that the audio-visual presentation as a whole was capable of
26. Id at 90-I.
27. Id at 93.
28. Id
29. Id at 96.
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a defamatory meaning, would not the reasonable viewer find the
whole programme defamatory? Applying the test from Sim v.
Stretch again, would not the entire programme tend to lower the
plaintiffs in the estimation of right-thinking members of society?
With great respect to the learned trial judge, it is submitted that these
are questions which he ought fairly to have dealt with in his reasons.
They are questions which will surely arise in similar cases in this area
in the future. Some conjecture on how they will be dealt with is in
order.
This case presents what may be the first instance in Anglo-
Canadian law in which non-defamatory words in conjunction with
visual parts of a television programme have given rise to liability in
defamation. It seems that neither the words by themselves, nor the
pictures by themselves would have resulted in liability; it was the
combination which gave offence.30 Indeed, the film production editor
of the programme testified that the showing of the photo of Burnett
and/or his car, with Maclntyre talking about "dirty tricks" at the
same time, would link Burnett with those dirty tricks. The film editor
said that "this implication arose and that such is a professional
technique." 3' This aspect of the decision is of enormous potential
consequence to makers of television documentaries and news pro-
grammes. Burnett (No. 1) makes it clear that such broadcasters,
accused of defamation, have to be concerned with more than getting
their facts straight and keeping their vocal comment fair. In light of
Burnett (No. 1) they must have regard to the context or format of the
presentation: the combined effect of the whole "package". It is there-
fore the producer, he who "puts the show together", who must now
be more vigilant. The executive and field producer for the episode in
question was Paul Kells. He seems to have been under the impression
that to guard against defamation he need only have ensured that:
"Maclntyre and anyone else working on the show, had all sufficient
information to back up what was said on the programme." 32
That is not enough. Burnett (No. 1) clearly suggests that the format of
presentation must also be fair. How is the producer to gauge this
fairness?
30. There is nothing in the trialjudgment to indicate that any ofthe video-pictures used,
or any combinations thereof in the programme, could be considered to be defamatory,
independent of the script. In light of the Vander Zalm and Youssoupoffcases, discussed
infra, it is suggested there would be adequate legal grounds for such a finding in some
future case.
31. Burnett (No. 1) at 105.
32. Id at 4.
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It may be possible to avoid liability in such a situation simply by
avoiding the use of the plaintiff's picture, or any picture identifying
him, while the "strong language" is being used. It is possible to read
Burnett (No. 1) so that the pictures were relevant to the defamation
only in that they identified Joe Burnett as the subject of Maclntyre's
"dirty tricks" comments. In that case, the pictures would not have
contributed to the defamatory meaning; they would have been rele-
vant only to the question of identification of Burnett as the subject of
the remarks. It will be recalled that Grant J. says that the use of the
pictures led to the inference that the comments concerned Burnett.
On this narrow reading of the case, where the pictures served only the
purpose of identification, it might be argued forcefully that the
defamatory imputation arose from the words alone and not from the
words and pictures; that the pictures did not contribute to the actual
defamation. The case might well be distinguished on this basis. But
there are serious problems with such an argument. It will be recalled
that the judge says explicitly that the "cumulative effect of the words
and the images were [sic] defamatory." 33 Also, Grant J. explicitly
found that the words by themselves were not defamatory. Aside from
identifying the plaintiff, then, there must have been something in the
pictures which did contribute to the defamatory imputation. This is
probably the better reading of the case. But that brings us back to the
question of how the pictures, in conjunction with the words, are to be
judged for defamatory meaning. Recourse to the few decided cases in
the area may suggest an answer.
There are a handful of cases which Grant J. might have cited as
support for his decision. Early in the age of broadcasting, Sankey
L. J., o*biter, foresaw the problems which would arise in the area of
defamation:
Spoken words divorced from their context and surroundings may
appear to be a slander which when controlled by such context and
surroundings are nothing of the sort. Gesture, tone of voice, expres-
sion of countenance ... may materially affect the spoken words. 34
The relationship between speech and pictures in an audio-visual
presentation was discussed briefly in Youssoupoffv. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer. This was the famous case in which a Russian princess alleged
a film defamed her by inferring she had been raped by the mad monk,
Rasputin. In holding that publication of a ilAm is libel, not slander,
Slesser L. J. commented:
33. See passages cited at 3, 13, ante.
34. Broome v. Agar (1928), 138 L.T. 698 (C.A.) at 702.
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I regard the speech which is synchronized with the photographic
reproduction and forms part of one complex, common exhibition as
an ancillary circumstance, part of the surroundings explaining that
which is to be seen.35
This could be interpreted as a basis for holding that the two elements,
audio and visual, together can give rise to a defamatory meaning,
although such as not the narrow ratio of the Youssoupoff case. A
recent Canadian case is more directly on point. Lougheed v. C.B.C.
arose out of a television play which alledgedly defamed Alberta
Premier Peter Lougheed. In the course of a judgment on an appeal
from an order for further particulars made by the trial judge, Cle-
ment J. A. said:
In many instances the matter complained of as defamatory may
consist in the combination of several factors. It is to be taken, of
course, that this particularity will have as its background the totality
of the production in the context of which the particular matters of
complaint are to be judged. 36
This view was given in relation to a play. But another case shortly
thereafter, also arising on an interlocutory matter, suggested that the
Lougheed view expressed above would also apply in the case of a
television news documentary.
In Vulcan Industrial Packaging Ltd. v. CB. C. et al., the Ontario
Master said:
In my view, the same considerations apply to this type of television
programme as apply to a television play, since they both have the vast
potential for presenting a message from elements in the programme
other than the spoken words themselves.37
Unfortunately, none of these cases were alluded to by Grant J. in
Burnett (No. 1). But although the Broome and Yousoupoff com-
ments are dicta, and the Lougheed and Vulcan comments arose on
interlocutory matters, Burnett (No. 1) appears to be the first trial
35. Youssoupoffv. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (1934), 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A.) at 587.
36. Lougheedv. C.B.C. (1979), 8 C.C.L.T. 120 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.) at 144.
37. Vulcan Industrial Packaging Ltd. v. C.B.C. et al. (1979),23 O.R. (2d) 213 (Ont.S.C.,
M.Ch.) at 226. Cf. the approach in the recent case of Vogelv. CB. C. (1982), 21 C.C.L.T.
105 (B.C., S.C.). There, EssonJ. suggested that the elements other than the spoken words
may contribute more to the seriousness of the defamation than the spoken words
themselves. At p. 170: "Images, facial expressions, tones of voice, symbols and the
dramatic effect which can be achieved by juxtaposition of segments may be more
important than the meaning derived from the careful reading ofthe words of the script ...
Here, regard must be had to the devices used to create an impression...." [Emphasis
added.]
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decision to have found defamation to arise from the combined
audio-visual elements of the programme or a portion thereof. That
being the case, the next question which arises concerns how the
combined elements are to be constructed to determine if their cumul-
ative effect is indeed defamatory.
There is little jurisprudence on the construction of pictures, let
alone of pictures and accompanying sound. The problem of translat-
ing visual images into words was touched upon in Vander Zalm v.
Times Publishers et al In oral arugment, an attempt was made to
translate the pictorial cartoon concerned into words, and then to
decide whether those words were defamatory. Seaton J. A. said:
That is an exercise of limited value and it contains within it a hazard.
It tends to focus attention on the words that have been substituted for
the cartoon rather than on the cartoon itself. If the translation from
cartoon to words is not done completely accurately, the proper test
might give an improper result because it is being applied to the wrong
subject. 38
In the end, Seaton J. A. says, you have to consider the cartoonper se.
Aikins J. A. concurred in the result, but suggested that the judge, in
construction of the meaning of the cartoon, should translate it into
words for the purpose of determining defamatory meaning.39 The
question of whether pictures by themselves were defamatory does not
appear to have been an issue in Burnett (No. I), but there was a
defamatory allegation concerning pictures combined with music.
The plaintiffs said in their statement of claim:
During the introduction, the title of the programme 'Law of the
Jungle' was portrayed on the screen across the picture of a graveyard
and in a manner and designed to create in the viewer a feeling that he
was witnessing something of a sinister or menacing nature.40
Grant J. held:
I find that the pictures and the music during the introduction did
create the impression of suspense or eeriness, perhaps, even evil.
However, they did not relate to the plaintiffs or any of them.41
Grant J. does not allude to any interpretation problem here; nor does
he discuss plaintiffs' interesting argument that such an opening
would create a context of evil or menace against which the rest of the
programme should be judged. Grant J. appears to frown on this
38. Vander Zalm v. Times Publishers et al., (1980] 4 W.W.R. 259 (B.C.C.A.) at 268.
39. Id at 285.
40. Quoted in Burnett (No. I) at 71.
41. Id
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argument, but support might have been found for that argument in
two Canadian cases.
There is some confusion over the question of to what extent
separate segments of an audio-visual presentation may be adjudged
in relation to one another or in relation to the programme as a whole.
Grant J. proceeded by analyzing each impugned segment on a
separate basis. He appeared loath to judge one segment in relation to
other segments, or in relation to the context of the whole programme.
In this way, he differed from the approach suggested in the Lougheed
case per Clement J.A.:
In my opinion, the whole must be taken into account in determining
whether any particular episode is defamatory, since it creates a
background or aura composed of all the elements of communication:
the spoken word in statements, or in dialogue of motives and objec-
tives, the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, the
skill of acting by gesture and expression, the emotional effect of
sound, and the like. These are all artfully done and recorded to
advance an effect of dramatic unity. Against this background which
constitutes the aura or atmosphere, episodes may be defamatory ...
although if taken in isolation they may appear innocuous.
42
In England v. C. B.C. & Clarkson, Tallis J., as he was then, was even
more explicit. That case concerned a coroner who sued over a
television public affairs programme, (an episode of the "Fifth Estate"
series), allegedly portraying him as incompetent. The trial judge in
England was concerned with only words, not words andpictures. But
even with this less complicated res controversa, Tallis J. did not think
it useful to consider each impugned segment as a watertight
compartment:
"It seems to me that the authorities support the view that it is the
broad effect of the publication that counts. There is no purpose and it
would be improper for me to dissect the words of the television
broadcast neatly as one might do in interpreting an insurance con-
tract. It is what the ordinary man hearing and viewing the television
broadcast would think."43
This led Tallis J. to conclude that "... the alleged irregularities des-
cribed in the programme must be viewed in a cumulative way."44 It is
suggested that if Grant J. had adopted the approach of Tallis J., the
whole episode attacked in Burnett (No. 1), or at least more segments
42. Lougheed, supra, note 36 at 142-3.
43. England v. C B.C. & Clarkson, [1979] 3 W.W.R. 193 (N.W.T.S.C.) at 209.
44. Ibid., p. 210.
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of it, might very well have been found to be defamatory. It is
respectfully submitted that the approach discussed in England and
Lougheed is to be preferred to that followed in Burnett (No. 1). Not
only does it seem more in accord with common sense, but it is also
more conducive to brevity of judgments.
One interesting aspect of Burnett (No. 1) may be considered
briefly: the finding of personal liability of Linden Maclntyre. 45 The
learned trial judge found that none of Maclntyre's words were
defamatory of the plaintiffs. Nor was he involved in the selection of
pictures and captions shown, or the sequence in which they were
fitted together in production of the programme. Grant J. says:
The defamatory material was inserted by others and approved by
others, not Maclntyre.
However, the programme bears his name and he has been nomi-
nated for and received awards for other performances in this series.
One can hardly absolve him from all responsibility for a telecast if he
stands in a position where he can receive an award for it.46
This is an extraordinary basis for liability. It has always tended to be
considered trite law that it is a complete defence where it is estab-
lished that the defendant did not publish the words complained of.47
Receiving an award can hardly be considered a basis for attaching
legal liability in such circumstances. This liability finding is all the
more remarkable in view of the following comment of the trial judge:
It seems to me to be difficult that a person who performs his or her
functional responsibility in a lawful manner should be held liable in
defamation because another, not under his direction or control, in
performing his or her function inserts some improper material .... 48
With great respect, the finding of liability against Maclntyre must be
in error.
In summary, it should be seen that there are a substantial number
of issues raised in Burnett (No. 1) which are of consequence to the
law of defamation in Canadian broadcasting. The "fact as comment"
question is one which might well have arisen in relation to the "loan
sharking" allegation; in any event the trial judge's handling of this
specific allegation leaves much to be desired. The practice aide of the
functions of the judge and jury is a useful summary of undisputed
law. The analytical approach to determining defamatory meanings
45. See Burnett (No. I), pp. 103-5.
46. Ibid., p. 105.
47. Duncan & Neill on Defamation, supra, note 14, p. 53.
48. Burnett (No. 1), p. 104.
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was awkward and probably out of whack with what is probably the
sounder approach in Lougheed and England. The difficult issues
revolving around the inter-relationship of pictures and words/pic-
tures and music, the interpenetration of their meanings and the
method of interpenetration of their meanings; these issues were
skirted in the opinion. The learned trial judge tended to state his
conclusions without explaining how he arrived at them.
The narrow ratio of the case, that non-defamatory words and
pictures may in combination be defamatory, is new law. That's the
good news. This ruling makes it clear that the law will take into
account the method of presentation, as well as the information
communicated in determining defamatory meaning. The bad news is
that it is not clear what test may be used to determine when the
"cumulative effect" of the audio-visual presentation has gone too far.
For example, how does one determine whether sinister background
music leads the viewer to think less of the plaintiff? And once it is
determined that the cumulative effect of sound and imagery is
defamatory, what defences apply? Might fair comment still be avail-
able? If so, what test could be utilized to determine whether the
"cumulative effect" of the defamatory segment might still be pro-
tected? For example, could one argue that the use of sinister back-
ground music is "fair comment" in some circumstances? These are
difficult questions; they do not admit of easy answers.
For the answers, though, we should not have to wait too long. We
are likely to see more defamation cases like Burnett (No. 1) in the
not-too-distant future.
